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1.  Introduction 
The aim of this paper is to review the treatment of services in a sample of Free Trade 
agreements.    Some of the questions motivating this review are 
•  the extent to which the agreements have a common structure and content, which 
will facilitate their amalgamation and the extension of their conditions to current 
non-members 
•  the extent to which the agreements go beyond the commitments made by their 
members in the GATS 
•  the likelihood that preferential agreements of the type studied here will have a 
significant effect on regional services trade. 
There are in addition a number of other questions of interest with respect to the specific 
provisions of the agreements.    The agreements examined are listed in Table 1.   
 
Information is collated on the content of each agreement and transformed into scores, 
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according to the procedures outlined Tables A1-A3.  A lower score is applied to an 
arrangement which is regarded as less liberal, and a higher score is applied to more 
liberal arrangements.    Scores range between zero and one.    Tables A1-A3 contain the 
full set of scores organised by modes of supply for the various elements of the 
agreements, under sub-headings of the form and content of the agreement.  Because 
the scoring was also undertaken for about 80 regional agreements officially permitted 
by WTO, some notable findings obtained from the larger sample will also be reported in 
this paper. 
 
The following sections summarise some of the main conclusions with respect to form 
and content, the treatment of market access provisions compared to national treatment, 
the implications of larger membership and the treatment of rules of origin. The final 
section summarises the main points where we argue that while these agreements include 
some treatment of services, the ‘devil is in the detail’ of their provisions. 
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Table 2: Type of agreement by the region of the members 


















*: Based on UN regional classification.





















2.  Form  and  Content 
2-1. Regional characteristics of form 
The form of the agreement adopted in regional agreements varies significantly across 
the regions. Table 2, which refers to a larger sample of agreements, classifies the form 
of the sample agreements based on the region of the member countries. For example,   4
the Japan-Singapore agreement is included in the Asia-Asia regional combination 
(agreement). Evidently, the agreements where an Asian economy is involved generally 
more often take a GATS-like format, namely positive-binding (bottom-up) list for 
national treatment and market access. On the other hand, the agreements ratified in 
North American region and Western Hemisphere are mostly based on the NAFTA 
template, that is, a negative-list binding (top-down). 
 
Table 2 also reveals that European countries, in general, tend to select different 
strategies depending on the partner region. For instance, these countries are inclined to 
choose a negative-list approach for national treatment in the agreements with other 
European countries and with countries in the Americas and Northern America, but adopt 
the positive-list approach in the agreements with Asia and Africa. Because the latter 
regions are more likely to take a negative stance for liberalization in services, and a 
large number of sectoral reservations are often listed, a positive-list format is likely to 
be preferred in the agreements involving these regions. However, strategy within 
European agreements appears to have changed for market access, since the positive-list 
binding has become the mainstream approach for market access policy in most 
agreements, regardless of the partner region. 
 
The choice of form of binding varies among Asian countries. Whereas the ASEAN 
Framework Agreement on Services (AFAS) follows the GATS-style, services 
agreements involving Korea, such as Korea-Chile and Korea-Singapore, take the 
NAFTA-like form (see Figure 1 and Table A-4 at the end of the paper). Japan takes 
different approaches case by case. In the Japan-Singapore Economic Partnership   5
Agreement, Japan adopted the GATS-like agreement, which is contrary to the approach 
that Korea took in the agreement with Singapore. Meanwhile, in the free trade 
agreement with Mexico, Japan followed NAFTA-like negative-list approach.   
 
Figure 1, which compares the degree of liberalization of the agreements based on the 
simple averages of the scorings, reveals that, regarding mode 3 and 4, there are no 
outstanding agreements in terms of liberalization in trade in services. The scores on 
mode 1 and 2 have relatively larger variations among agreements.  Generally, the 
Australia-US agreement and CER could be regarded as more liberal than other 
agreements.  
Figure 1: The simple averages of scores 



























































































































< Negative list > < Positive list >
 
         N o t e :   
1.    AFTA-China is still under negotiation. 
              2.    No commitment for market access in EFTA and Japan-Mexico.   6

























































































































































































































































< Negative list > < Positive list >
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In addition, the difference in form does not always indicate the degree of liberalization. 
For example, regarding mode 1 and 2, the scoring results show that the form of the 
Japan-Singapore agreement is no less liberal compared to the Japan-Mexico agreement 
(Figure 1). The former follows the GATS-template, while the latter does not necessarily 
cover the liberalizing measures stipulated in GATS, e.g. market access and domestic 
regulations (see Table A-4). 
 
With regard to air transport services, most agreements have not included more 
far-reaching commitments than the existing GATS and NAFTA treatment. Namely, the 
agreements do not apply to measures affecting traffic rights including the services 
directly related to the exercise of traffic rights. EU-Mexico and NAFTA explicitly 
exclude the commitments to liberalization on air transport services. Therefore most 
regional agreements have not embarked on making a regional framework to liberalize 
air transport. 
 
2-2. Negative-list vs. Positive-list approach - contents 
More generally, it seems that whether an agreement follows a negative-list approach or 
positive-list approach does not always indicate the extent of liberalization, as is 
sometimes argued. The comparison of the form of agreement in Figure 1 shows that the 
agreements based on a negative-list approach are not always more liberal than those 
following the positive-list style for mode 1 and 2. However, a more critical factor 
characterizing the effectiveness of liberalization measures for trade in services is the 
‘presentation and contents’ of the list, especially sectoral reservations, rather than its 
format.    8
 
The system of sectoral classification of services is important. A positive-binding style 
lists all the sectors opened for the suppliers in other member countries on the basis of 
Central Product Classification (CPC) as in GATS. Restrictions are frequently attached 
even if a sector is contained in the liberalizing list. Meanwhile, a negative-binding 
format indicates the reserved sectors, but it is sometimes based on each country’s own 
sectoral classification (Japan, Mexico, US, Canada etc.). Although concordance tables 
between these different classifications are available, comparisons might be misleading 
because there are several cases in which each country’s own classification is applied 
only to some sensitive sectors such as business services while others are classified by 
the CPC system.    Bearing in mind these qualifications, this study continues to compare 
agreements according to the concordance tables
1. 
 
Table 3 reveals that a great number of agreements include sectoral exclusions in their 
specific commitments. The agreements involving Australia such as CER and 
Australia-US agreement generally provide a smaller number of sectoral reservations, 
whereas many agreements involving developing countries such as AFTA more likely 
contain many sectoral restrictions. In general, a larger number of sectoral reservations 
and severe restrictions are attached to the sensitive sectors such as financial services, 
communication services and transport services, while tourism and travel services and 
construction services are likely to have a smaller number of reservations.   
 
 
                                                 
1  http://www.osha.gov/pls/imis/sic_manual.html, 
http://www.stat.go.jp/index/seido/sangyo/   9














Based on CPC classification: Total=138 sectors  
 
Table 4 sets out the shares of the sub-sectors that are reserved and compares these 
shares to those in the commitments made in GATS by the member economies.
2 The 
results at sectoral level are reported in Table A-5 at the end of the report.   
 
Most regional agreements include more far-reaching commitments than evident under 
GATS. While GATS commitments are often minimal, in the regional agreements, 
remarkable progress appears to be made in many sectors, especially, transport services, 
and in many regions, with the exception of AFAS. Some members of ASEAN have 
made less advanced commitments under the framework of that regional trade agreement, 
as pointed out in Nikomborirak and Stephenson (2001), mainly a result of the 
imposition of restrictions rather than an increase in the number of sectoral exclusions.
3 
                                                 
2  GATS data are from 
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/serv_e/serv_commitments_e.htm 
3  In some cases, commitments in regional agreements appear to be less than those in the 
GATS. This could arise from differences of the dates in which the agreements entered 
into force and because of different approaches in sectoral classifications.   10
Table 4: Scoring results on sectoral exclusions (% of exclusions) 
GATS GATS GATS
AFTA 90.1 83.9 48.5 89.6 37.6 80.1
Brunei 83.3 96.4 99.3 99.3 83.3 87.7
Cambodia 92.0 63.8 92.8 60.9 84.1 40.6
Indonesia 98.6 91.3 100.0 96.4 98.6 93.5
Laos 87.0 - 89.1 - 95.7 -
Malaysia 84.8 65.2 97.8 91.3 91.3 63.0
Myanmar 94.9 87.7 100.0 99.3 98.6 99.3
Philippines 92.0 91.3 98.6 91.3 97.8 86.2
Singapore 86.2 79.7 90.6 81.2 92.8 88.4
Thailand 90.6 95.7 89.1 97.1 87.0 81.9
Vietnam 92.0 - 100.0 - 83.3 -
AFTA-China 100.0 78.2 100.0 93.7 100.0 66.8
AFTA 100.0 83.9 100.0 89.6 100.0 80.1
China 100.0 72.5 100.0 97.8 100.0 53.6
Australia-US 23.6 51.4 29.0 58.0 23.6 44.6
Australia 22.5 51.4 34.8 52.2 22.5 47.1
USA 24.6 51.4 23.2 63.8 24.6 42.0
CER 8.0 55.1 8.0 56.5 8.0 47.8
Australia 6.5 51.4 6.5 52.2 6.5 47.1
New Zealand 9.4 58.7 9.4 60.9 9.4 48.6
Chile-Korea 46.4 84.8 35.5 84.4 46.4 67.8
Chile 42.0 93.5 29.7 94.9 42.0 84.8
Korea 50.7 76.1 41.3 73.9 50.7 50.7
EFTA 43.7 50.9 100.0 59.4 66.7 46.0
Iceland 41.3 52.2 42.4 60.1 48.6 42.8
Liechtenstein 45.7 42.8 95.7 46.4 91.2 38.4
Norway 47.8 63.8 39.1 70.3 54.3 55.8
Switzerland 39.9 44.9 45.7 60.9 42.8 47.1
EU-Mexico 61.2 53.3 44.2 62.3 43.7 68.8
EU (Avg.) 46.4 46.4 41.3 48.5 41.3 37.6
Mexico 76.1 76.1 48.6 100.0 47.8 66.7
Japan-Mexico 53.3 62.0 42.8 77.2 53.3 52.5
Japan 48.6 47.8 30.4 54.3 48.6 38.4
Mexico 58.0 76.1 55.1 100.0 58.0 66.7
Japan-Singapore 46.7 63.8 53.6 67.8 62.7 63.4
Japan 44.2 47.8 55.1 54.3 25.4 38.4
Singapore 49.3 79.7 52.2 81.2 100.0 88.4
Korea-Singapore 59.8 77.9 55.1 77.5 49.3 69.6
Korea 70.3 76.1 60.1 73.9 59.4 50.7
Singapore 49.3 79.7 50.0 81.2 39.1 88.4
NAFTA 37.2 64.5 37.2 76.3 37.2 56.3
Canada 30.4 51.4 20.3 63.8 30.4 42.0
Mexico 45.7 65.9 55.8 65.2 45.7 60.1
USA 35.5 76.1 35.5 100.0 35.5 66.7
Singapore-US 59.4 65.6 39.9 72.5 39.9 65.2
Singapore 49.3 79.7 74.2 81.2 52.2 88.4
USA 69.6 51.4 47.1 63.8 45.7 42.0
Mode 1 and 2 Mode 3 Mode 4
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Meanwhile, the importance of sectoral commitments is significantly affected by 
horizontal commitments or reservations. Table 5(a) lists the commonly applied 
restrictions on horizontal commitments and in comparison Table 5(b) illustrates some of 
the common sectoral restrictions. 
 
In horizontal commitments, substantial restrictions have been imposed on the supply of 
a service, in particular, in mode 3 for the negative-list agreements and in modes 3 and 4 
for the positive-list agreements. Although direct restrictions on entry (market access and 
local presence) are common in a lot of agreements, indirect restrictions related to 
domestic regulations are also significant (such as those related to recognition of 
qualifications and certifications for mode 1 and 2). AFAS, for example, shows a wide 
range of reservations which may considerably undermine the effect of liberalization 
measures. 
 
In AFAS, many limitations dismantling the effectiveness of liberalization are imposed in 
horizontal commitments, for instance, restrictions on the form of establishment and the 
dominance of domestic labour law are explicitly designated, so that the number of 
sectors committed to liberalization may not always be a proper indicator of the degree 
of liberalization. This point is more likely to be the case for mode 4 transactions where 
sectoral commitments in a positive-list agreement are frequently described as ‘Unbound 
except as indicated in the horizontal section’ and few sectoral limitations are added, 
which may in part suggest that the regulation on this transaction mode is less sensitive 
to the sector involved. In horizontal commitments, the coverage of persons who are 
eligible to enter the market is often strictly regulated (e.g. only skilled workers,   12
managers and directors, or intra-corporate transferees), so that the sectoral coverage of 
commitments may not be so important. 
 
Table 5(a): Horizontal Commitments (Reservations) 
Agreements Commitments
NAFTA Ownership restrictions for enterprises (including both private and public enterprises (3)*
Review on direct acquisitions of large assets (3)
Limited majority of foreign board of directors (3)
Residency requirements for ownership (3)
Restrictions on land acquisitions (3)
Requirement for local presence (all)
Aboriginal affairs (all)
EFTA Denial of benefits for enterprises with less substantial presence (3)
Considerations for balanced proportion of national and foreign capital,
     the number of foreigners relative to local population, balanced number of
     jobs in comparison with the number of the resident population, balanced
     geographic situation and balanced development of the national economy (all)
Requirement for licences and qualifications (all)
Residential requirement (all)
Restrictions on land acquisitions (3)
Restrictions on the foreign managing directors and board of directors (3)
Restricted eligibility for subsidies (all)
Mexico-EU Limitations on the categories of persons eligible for the entry (4)
Allowed period of stay (4)
Requirements for working experience prior to the entry (4)
Requirements for qualifications (4)
Restrictions on the number of persons (4)
Restrictions on land acquisitions (3)
Restrictions on acquisition or sale of bonds and treasury bills (3)
US-Singapore Restrictions on the sale of shares owned by state enterprises (3)
Limitations on equity ownership (3)
Nationality and residential requirement for registration of business and local manager (all)
Land acquisitions and usage (3)
The right to adopt or maintain limitations for market access in a manner which is not
     inconsistent with GATS (all)
The right to adopt or maintain limitations for national treatment under any international
     agreement in force (all)
Minority affairs (all)
AFAS Restrictions on the nationality of board of directors (3)
Categories of persons allowed to enter a member country (4)
Requirement for licences for establishing enterprises (3)
Restrictions on the type of establishment (e.g. joint venture, limited liability enterprise) (3)
Restrictions on capital ownership (3)
Applicability of the Labour Law and Immigration Law (4)
Land acquisitions (3)
Requirements for professional qualifications (3, 4)
Period of entry (4)
Applicability of an economic needs test for intra-corporate transfer of experts (4)
Discriminated profit tax for foreign enterprises (3)
Restrictions on acquisitions, mergers and take-overs (3)
Limitations on the access to domestic credit (3)
Limitations on access to incentives (3)
*: Transaction mode in parentheses.    13
Table 5(a) (Cont): Horizontal Commitments (Reservations) 
Agreements Commitments
AFTA-China Under negotiation
Japan-Singapore Restrictions on the access to subsidies and incentives (3, 4)
Obligations for employment of the manager and director who are locally resident (3, 4)
Land acquisitions (3)
Regulation on local currency transactions (3)
Exceptions for national treatment on the privatization of assets owned by the government (3)
Limitations on permanent residents (3)
Period of entry (4)
Categories of persons allowed to enter a member country (4)
No national treatment for the mode 4 entry into Singapore (4)
Japan-Mexico Nationality requirements for board of director (3)
Restrictions on foreign ownership (3)
Restricted access to subsidies (3, 4)
The right to adopt or maintain any measure relating to new services (1,2,4)
Restrictions on acquisition or sale of bonds and treasury bills (3)
Chile-Korea Land acquisitions (3)
Employment requirement for local residents (1,2)
Residency requirement (local presence) (1,2)
Aboriginal affairs (all)
Restrictions on the acquisitions of sold or disposed equity interests and assets of
     existing state enterprises (3)
Required authorization for capital transactions of non-residents (3)
Korea-Singapore Restrictions on the supply of a service through mode 4 (all)
Authorization for capital transactions of non-residents (3)
Restrictions on the acquisitions of sold or disposed equity interests and assets of
     existing state enterprises (3)
Land acquisitions (3)
Minority affairs (all)
Australia-US All existing non-conforming measures at the regional level of government (all)
Applicability of restrictions on large investment for some corporations in all sectors
CER No horizontal reservations  
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Table 5(b): Reservations on Specific Commitments for Selected Sectors 
Sectors Reservations often applied
Business Services Restrictions on the number of services suppliers (1,2)*
Qualifications of persons, directors or enterprises (1,2,3)
Registration requirement for a service supplier (1,2,3)
Restrictions on foreign ownership and board of directors (3)
Minimum number of local nationality (1,2)
Experiences prior to the entry (1,2)
Local presence (1,2)
Specific requirements for certifications and licences (1,2)
Communication Services Registration requirement for a service supplier (1,2,3)
Monopoly by a local company for some services (3)
Prior notification requirement for investment by foreigners on
     telecommunication services (3)
Local nationality requirement for enterprises (3)
Limit on foreign participation for some businesses (3)
Restrictions on foreign ownership (3)
Distribution Services Local presence (1,2)
Financial Services Commercial presence (1,2)
Licences for particular businesses (1,2,3)
Laws on protection of confidentiality of information (1,2,3)
Health Related Qualifications of persons, directors or enterprises (1,2,3)
   and Social Services Registration requirement for a service supplier (1,2,3)
Transport Services Foreign ownership and control of, and operation of vessels and air services
Pollution control, barge inspection standards, water quality, pilotage, salvage,
     drug abuse control and maritime communications.
Certification, licensing and citizenship requirements for crew members
Manning requirements
Monopoly by a local company for some sectors
Authorization by the government
Residential restrictions and nationality restrictions
*: Transaction mode in parentheses.  
 
2-3. GATS template vs. NAFTA template 
NAFTA-type agreements are likely to cover liberalization measures more 
comprehensively (see Table A-4 in appendix). The provisions which would be important 
for the conduct of trade and investment in services, e.g. those on domestic regulations, 
monopolies, and transparency, are more often found in this type of agreement than in 
the GATS-type. This may be due partly to the structure of the text, since in the NAFTA 
template these measures are treated independently of the chapter of trade in services and 
are applicable to all the goods and services traded, unlike the GATS template where   15
most of measures are generally prescribed in the services chapter
4. There are few cases 
in which services are excluded from the provisions of the independent chapters, 
although the exclusion of services is more common in government procurement. 
 
Investment in services and the movement of people are treated in an independent 
chapter in more recent agreements. However in some agreements such as 
Japan-Singapore agreement and AFAS, investment liberalization in services sectors is 
treated in both the services chapter (mode 3) and in an independent investment chapter 
or another investment agreement. And the priority of the application of the regulation is 
not clearly specified. Although the Agreement on the ASEAN Investment Area specifies 
that investment in services sectors is regulated in AFAS, the Japan-Singapore agreement 
does not always clarify the relationship between investment and the services chapter, 
which may thus lead to a confusion of the interpretations. In addition, the separate 
investment chapter is in line with the negative-list approach and its horizontal 




Generally in most NAFTA-like agreements, the future negotiation process is presented 
in the text, while GATS-like agreements often appear to do no more that reiterate the 
bindings of the GATS. As often pointed out, GATS provisions are on the whole less 
liberal than actual policy. Countries which prefer the positive-list approach appear to 
                                                 
4  However, recent agreements based on the GATS template tend to provide these 
measures in an independent chapter. 
5  The treatment for the mode 4 transaction also includes the similar problem. Namely, 
movement of natural persons is also stipulated in an independent chapter. However, the 
annex on this chapter usually corresponds to the horizontal commitment for the mode 4 
services transaction.   16
have aimed at restraining liberalization to the minimum level. For example, the ASEAN 
services trade agreement (AFAS) has adopted a GATS-plus approach, which aims at 
expanding the sectoral coverage through regular negotiation. In the sense that it 
establishes the minimum level of liberalization and extends the liberalization step by 
step without a setback, this approach seems to promote future liberalization. However, 
an extremely limited number of sectors have been included in each member’s 
commitments in AFAS at this stage. The commitments to date have been revised four 
times since the agreement was signed, that is, 1997, 1998, 2001, and 2004, and the 
services sectors contained in the positive list have gradually increased, but a lot of 
restrictions have been attached to the liberalized items. Consequently, the current AFAS 
has not been so effective in promoting services trade liberalization in this region: 
according to a study of AFAS at sectoral level (Nikomborirak and Stephenson (2001)), 
it remains less liberal than the GATS. 
 
The ASEAN-China agreement is still under negotiation, and at this stage, provisions on 
services have not been well stipulated and only an endeavour for future liberalization 
has been proposed.  However even if it is formally ratified, the experience to date in 
ASEAN suggests that the liberalization between China and ASEAN would not be 
ambitious. 
 
To conclude, based on the observation of these agreements, the extent of liberalization 
does not significantly differ between approaches to documenting commitments, but the 
choice may contribute to differences in the effectiveness of the future liberalization. 
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3. Domestic Regulation 
Provisions on the regulatory conduct of a member country in a non-discriminatory 
manner are essential to services trade liberalization. However, as the scoring results in 
Table A-4 in appendix reveal, agreements offering this article are not popular. Although 
GATS stipulates this provision and attempts to facilitate the coordination and 
cooperation of non-discriminatory restrictions among members, especially through 
licensing and recognition of qualifications, many regional agreements to date appear 
reluctant to commit these issues. Many regional services agreements have not had the 
power to enforce effective liberalization and indirect restrictions continue to be imposed 
on the activities of service providers within a member country. In addition, federal states 
such as USA and Canada generally have allowed each state or province to adopt their 
own non-discriminatory regulations, which makes regulatory situation even more 
complicated. 
 
A large number of reservations or restrictions on documented commitments appear to be 
associated with domestic regulations. For example, foreign suppliers’ entry into the 
business (professional) services sector requires local (domestic) licences. On trade in 
services through mode 4, domestic labour law is frequently applied to persons who 
enter the country for supplying services. In most cases the terms and conditions of entry 
must follow the rules stipulated in domestic law. 
 
Mutual recognition will be a necessary procedure for cross-border transactions of 
services and is offered in many agreements. The provisions seem to be, as a whole, 
more strictly binding than those in the GATS. However, as stated earlier, most sectoral   18
commitments also provide restrictions on (that is, reservations which refer to) 
qualifications of services providers, in particular, in professional services, transport 
services, telecommunication services, and financial services, as illustrated in Table 5(b). 
 
Regulations on transfers payments and transparency are common in regional agreements. 
The former appears to be more liberal except when balance of payments problems arise, 
but regarding the latter, there is a large gap between form and content. Some measures 
for maintaining transparency of rules such as publishing and notification requirements 
exist in most agreements, but the transparency of the contents themselves seems to be 
disappointing since the format of the contents has not always been standardized. In 
particular, the status-quo regulatory structure generally is not made clear in the 
positive-list approach.   
 
Treatment regulating subsidies and business practices in services sectors seems less 
prevalent in regional agreements, and only the Japan-Singapore agreement, 
Australia-US agreement, and CER include a provision on business practice. The 
possibility of discriminatory treatment on subsidies is specified in services chapters in 
most cases. Regulations on monopolies and exclusive suppliers are often treated in a 
separate chapter, which is horizontally applicable to the industries other than services. 
Anti-competitive behaviour is in principle prohibited, but the application of this rule has 
been excluded in some key sectors such as telecommunications and transport services 
where a few domestic providers are empowered to supply services monopolistically. 
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4. Market access and national treatment 
Market access and national treatment are fundamental principles in the liberalization of 
trade and investment in services. While the distinction between market access and 
national treatment actually appears ambiguous in the case of services, applying the 
guidelines for this distinction published by WTO, the restrictions on national treatment 
often found in the twelve agreements are associated with the residency requirements 
(including prior residence) and limited access to subsidies. In many agreements 
professional services suppliers are required to be a resident, which is inconsistent with 
the principle of non-residency. According to the Japan-Singapore agreement, only 
Japanese firms can access to R&D subsidies in Japan, and more general limitations on 
access to subsidies by suppliers of the other party are found in the Japan-Mexico 
agreement (e.g. see Table 5(a) on horizontal commitments).   
 
The treatment of market access and national treatment differs between the GATS 
approach and NAFTA counterpart. The agreements adopting a negative-list approach, 
for example, Chile-Korea, Korea-Singapore, and Australia-US, stipulate the adoption of 
national treatment and market access in a general manner, unlike GATS or GATS-like 
agreements such as Japan-Singapore in which these provisions are treated as specific 
commitments and are applied only to the sectors listed by each member as sectoral 
commitments. In this sense, the former appears to be more liberal.   
 
On the other hand, a greater number of limitations on market access have been retained 
in many sectors, and in forms such as nationality requirements, rules on foreign   20
ownership
6 and on the form of establishment (e.g. use of joint ventures), and 
restrictions on the total number of service operations (quantitative restrictions). These 
restrictions on market access appear to have been the more serious impediments for 
liberalization of trade in services.   
 
Limitations on market access protect domestic market rents. Because most of sectoral 
exclusions are relevant to market access, a comparison of the number of such 
reservations may give a picture of the difference in the extent of market access between 
agreements. Tables 3 and 4 reveal that bilateral agreements between developed 
countries, e.g. Australia-US and CER, are likely to have a smaller number of exclusions 
whereas all agreements involving less-developed countries and agreements with 
multiple members tend to have many sectoral reservations. This finding may suggest 
that developed countries where services suppliers are well-developed and the market 
size of services is relatively significant may have an incentive to share or exchange 
access to rents via a bilateral agreement while providing protection from suppliers in 
other regions. On the other hand, developing countries in which services markets and 




5. Comparison between bilateral and multiple member agreements 
There are no clear differences between bilateral and multiple-member agreements with 
regard to the form or contents. The choice of the binding-style with regard to sectoral 
                                                 
6  This is included in the limitations on national treatment as well.   21
commitments seems to be less dependent on whether an agreement is bilateral or 
multiple-member. In addition, the sectoral exclusions or reservations do not also appear 
to be affected by this dimension of the agreement.   
 
Provisions on domestic regulations are more likely to be included in bilateral 
agreements (e.g. US-Singapore, Japan-Singapore, Korea-Singapore, Australia-US). 
Regarding mutual recognition, bilateral agreements tend to contain more liberal 
provisions than GATS. On mode 3 transactions, bilateral agreements more often include 
a chapter on investment or more liberal provisions on investor-state dispute settlement 
mechanisms, on nationality (residency) of management and board of directors, and on 
performance requirements. Although these findings might indicate that bilateral 
agreements may tend to contain broader coverage than agreements with more than two 
members, restrictions remain even on these items: these are listed in within the specific 
commitments, regardless of the type of agreement. 
 
 
6. Rules of Origin 
Many agreements have a provision on rules of origin, In general, this regulation 
provides two cases to which the denial of benefits is applied; (1) no substantive business 
operations in the territory of other parties, and (2) services supplied by a firm owned by 
persons in a non-party.   
 
Some agreements, for example, Japan-Singapore and Korea-Singapore, contain an 
independent article on the denial of benefits while other agreements, such as   22
EU-Mexico, include the possibility to deny the benefits for suppliers which have no 
substantial business operations in the territory of the other parties in the article on the 
coverage or definition of services.   
 
Services supplied by the firms which are outsourcing to non-parties who are not eligible 
for the benefits from the agreement may not meet the rule of origin.    However often it 
will be difficult to specify the origin of the services, unlike the case of manufactured 
goods, in particular, in the service industries where e-commerce is used an important 
tool for cross-boarder trade. 
 
 
7. Overall evaluation on liberalization 
Lastly, we evaluate the degree of services liberalization for each agreement. One way to 
carry out the evaluation is to compute the average of the scores for each item in the 
scoring system and then assess each agreement according to its average score.    Yet, the 
importance or weight of each item is assumed to be the same in this procedure.   
 
This study instead employs factor analysis to determine the appropriate weights on each 
item. The factor analysis was based on the larger sample (80 agreements) and, using the 
scoring result for each item, common factors which may characterize the degree of 
liberalization of these agreements were extracted. The first factor appears to represent 
an overall indicator of services liberalization because a greater value is allocated both to 
the main measures of form such as national treatment and market access and to various 
measures of contents. In addition, the first factor explains 50% of the total variances,   23
thus indicating the validity of using this factor as a source of the weights. This result is 
also valid for all modes of trade in services.  The components of the first factor were 
then used to determine the weight for each scoring item. The main results of the factor 
analysis are reported in Table 6.
7  
 
According to this procedure, EFTA, AFTA, Australia-US and CER are judged as more 
liberal for cross-boarder trade. It might be surprising that AFTA has been regarded as 
quite liberal, but the fundamental form may be relatively well-established because it 
adopts GATS-plus approach. CER, Mexico-EU, Japan-Mexico and EFTA take a larger 
value for mode 3 and EFTA, CER, and Chile-Korea do for mode 4 transactions. It is 
evident that CER is considerably liberal for all modes of trade in services. 
 
Moreover, the results indicate that the agreements based on a negative-list binding 
format are not necessarily more liberal than those following a positive-list binding form. 
For example, the US-Singapore and Chile-Korea agreement are not so liberal even 
though they are built on the negative-list approach.   
 
We should note that the overall scores obtained from the factor analysis are correlated 
with those from the simple average value. For example, excluding AFTA-China which 
is still under negotiation, the correlation coefficient is 0.22 for mode 1 and 2, 0.31 for 
mode 3 and 0.43 for mode 4.  However, as shown in Table 7, the rank correlation of 
the measures is not statistically significant with the exception of mode 4. 
 
                                                 
7  The Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin measure of sampling adequacy, reported in the Table, 
supports the validity of using the sample for implementing the factor analysis.   24
 
Table 6:    Results of Factor Analysis 
 
(1) Mode 1 and 2 
 
(a) Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin test:  0.808
(b) Total Variance Explained
Factor Total % of Variance Cumulative %
1 13.2 50.8 50.8
22 . 3 8 . 9 5 9 . 7
31 . 9 7 . 5 6 7 . 2
41 . 6 6 . 1 7 3 . 2
51 . 3 5 . 1 7 8 . 3
(c) Rotated Factor Matrix
12345
Form
Scope 0.770 0.233 0.335 0.143 0.207
MFN 0.693 0.356 0.101 0.205 0.103
MFN Exemption 0.087 0.122 0.020 0.041 0.555
National Treatment 0.649 0.594 0.327 -0.007 0.121
Market Access 0.474 0.536 0.197 0.289 0.253
Local Presence 0.192 0.876 -0.009 0.062 0.141
Domestic Regulations 0.144 0.120 0.420 0.800 0.261
Transparency 0.072 0.436 0.597 0.169 0.330
Recognition 0.547 0.555 0.277 0.294 0.021
Monopolies 0.319 0.072 0.792 0.180 0.226
Business Practices 0.302 -0.070 0.294 0.462 -0.173
Transfer and Payments 0.367 -0.016 0.781 0.297 -0.169
Denial of Benefits 0.627 0.482 0.241 0.346 0.148
Safeguard -0.421 -0.208 0.098 -0.332 0.260
Subsidies 0.251 -0.174 0.130 0.472 0.535
Government Procurement 0.207 0.310 0.636 0.229 0.104
Ratchet Mechanism 0.399 0.720 0.141 -0.236 -0.178
Telecommunication 0.206 0.544 0.388 0.423 0.067
Financial Services 0.286 0.281 0.242 0.456 0.063
Contents
Excluded Modes 0.811 0.271 0.358 0.187 0.105
Excluded Form 0.840 0.225 0.256 0.181 0.061
Sectoral Exclusions 0.408 0.077 0.335 -0.134 0.474
Regional Measures 0.819 0.197 0.299 0.082 0.235
Land Acquisitions 0.871 0.250 0.273 0.058 0.145
Minority Affairs 0.891 0.017 -0.033 0.264 0.099
Number of Domestic Employees 0.777 0.257 0.309 0.268 0.046
Extraction Method: Maximum Likelihood.  
Rotation Method: Varimax with Kaiser Normalization.
Factor
Initial Eigenvalues
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Table 6(Cont):    Results of Factor Analysis   
 
(2) Mode 3 
 
(a) Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin test:  0.866
(b) Total Variance Explained
Factor Total % of Variance Cumulative %
1 11.7 48.8 48.8
2 2.6 11.0 59.9
3 1.5 6.3 66.1
4 1.2 5.2 71.3
5 1.2 4.9 76.2
6 1.0 4.2 80.4
(c) Rotated Factor Matrix
123456
Form
Coverage 0.559 0.532 0.359 0.253 0.226 -0.196
Scope 0.600 0.399 0.419 0.205 0.167 0.323
MFN 0.421 0.333 0.158 0.611 0.083 0.435
MFN Exemption 0.276 0.407 -0.117 0.233 0.031 -0.032
National Treatment 0.558 0.474 0.376 0.443 0.272 -0.022
Nationality of directors 0.184 0.578 0.144 0.254 -0.222 -0.015
Performance Requirement 0.227 0.596 0.173 0.167 -0.029 0.212
Tansparency 0.061 0.125 0.859 0.024 0.148 0.157
Denial of Benefits 0.405 0.502 0.107 0.208 0.046 0.539
Expropriation 0.085 0.929 0.184 -0.041 0.030 0.019
Transfer and Payments 0.550 0.162 0.388 0.131 0.468 0.068
Dispute Settlement 0.133 0.873 0.048 -0.003 0.083 0.007
Safeguard -0.118 0.107 -0.046 0.000 -0.542 -0.146
Subsidy 0.128 -0.078 0.136 0.029 0.167 0.493
Government Procurement 0.305 0.170 0.541 0.104 -0.017 0.103
Ratchet Mechanism 0.199 0.581 0.191 0.415 -0.206 0.023
Contents
Excluded Form 0.567 0.240 0.191 0.506 0.395 0.307
Sectoral Exclusions 0.395 0.394 0.166 -0.011 0.287 -0.010
Regional Measures 0.645 0.203 0.395 0.217 0.461 0.222
Land Acquisitions 0.767 0.170 -0.054 0.214 -0.118 -0.036
Minority Affairs 0.818 0.046 0.071 0.136 0.262 0.266
Prior Residence 0.736 0.365 0.356 0.136 0.144 0.248
Foreign Participation 0.794 0.328 0.251 0.089 0.067 0.159
Large Investment 0.752 0.203 0.188 0.033 0.182 0.307
Extraction Method: Maximum Likelihood.  
Rotation Method: Varimax with Kaiser Normalization.
Factor
Initial Eigenvalues
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Table 6(Cont):    Results of Factor Analysis   
 
(3) Mode 4 
 
(a) Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin test:  0.870
(b) Total Variance Explained
Factor Total % of Variance Cumulative %
1 13.2 50.8 50.8
2 2.3 8.9 59.7
3 1.9 7.5 67.2
4 1.6 6.1 73.2
5 1.3 5.1 78.3
(c) Rotated Factor Matrix
1234
Form
Coverage 0.665 0.642 0.118 0.253
scope 0.592 0.372 0.158 0.392
Immigration 0.077 -0.006 -0.125 0.476
MFN_Mode 4 Delivery 0.703 0.206 0.260 -0.100
MFN Exemption 0.060 0.041 0.176 0.470
National Treatment_Mode4 0.693 0.576 0.202 0.045
Market Access 0.566 0.461 0.379 0.188
Domestic Regulations 0.291 0.013 0.806 0.061
Transparency_Mode4 0.256 0.389 0.640 0.163
Transparency_Movement of People 0.187 0.622 0.221 0.157
Recognition 0.585 0.494 0.368 0.065
Denial of Benefits 0.720 0.352 0.485 -0.193
Ratchet Mechanism 0.429 0.766 -0.102 -0.296
Contents
Excluded Form 0.845 0.183 0.159 0.161
Sectoral Exclusions 0.307 0.259 0.314 0.591
Regional Measures 0.887 0.203 0.306 0.185
Skill of workers 0.762 0.290 -0.081 0.447
Short-Term Entry 0.846 0.363 0.078 0.246
Long-Term Entry 0.822 0.341 0.070 0.281
Number of Quotas 0.878 0.292 0.191 0.195
Labour Market Testing 0.081 0.462 0.059 0.095
Land Acquisitions 0.869 0.302 0.267 0.132
Minority Affairs 0.850 0.045 0.173 0.063
Number of Domestic Employees 0.776 0.171 0.288 0.185
Extraction Method: Maximum Likelihood.  
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As a consequence, the question arises of which overall indicator should be chosen. If we 
need to measure the degree of liberalization more exactly, and since the importance of 
each item varies, each item should be differently weighted. Factor analysis can be used 
to provide those weights. In particular, if we are concerned about the exact ranking of 
regional agreements on the extent of liberalization, this indicator will be more 
appropriate than the simple average. However, where we aim simply to obtain an 
assessment of the approximate degree of liberalization, the simple average which avoid 
the complicated estimation process of factor analysis is preferred. In addition, this 
indicator avoids the problem of factor analysis that its results may change with the 
sample used in estimation. For example, because more recent agreements are likely to 
be more sophisticated and liberal in terms of the coverage of liberalization measures, 
factor analysis may extract different factors depending on the sample period. Because 
this study covers all the past agreements notified by WTO, this problem may not be 
serious, but where the sample of agreements is small and this bias is thus expected to be 
large, the simple average score is preferred. 
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Table 7: Comparison of ranking based on the extent of liberalization 
1 Australia-US 0.810 CER 9.085
2 CER 0.685 Australia-US 8.601
3 Japan-Singapore 0.656 EFTA 8.296
4 US-Singapore 0.652 AFTA 8.048
5 Korea-Singapore 0.617 Japan-Singapore 7.924
6 NAFTA 0.598 Mexico-EU 7.445
7 EFTA 0.525 NAFTA 7.234
8 Chile-Korea 0.508 US-Singapore 6.958
9 Japan-Mexico 0.502 Korea-Singapore 6.645
10 AFTA 0.481 Japan-Mexico 6.370
11 Mexico-EU 0.475 Chile-Korea 5.471
1 Japan-Mexico 0.740 CER 7.950
2 Australia-US 0.723 Mexico-EU 7.872
3 US-Singapore 0.719 Japan-Mexico 7.716
4 NAFTA 0.667 EFTA 7.706
5 Chile-Korea 0.654 Australia-US 7.379
6 CER 0.652 US-Singapore 7.241
7 Korea-Singapore 0.638 NAFTA 6.871
8 Mexico-EU 0.583 Chile-Korea 6.835
9 EFTA 0.571 Korea-Singapore 6.509
10 Japan-Singapore 0.529 Japan-Singapore 6.469
11 AFTA 0.458 AFTA 5.583
Rank Correlation Coefficients: 0.427
Rank Correlation Coefficients: 0.409
Mode 3
Factor Analysis
Simple Averages Factor Analysis
Mode 1 and 2
Simple Averages
 
1 CER 0.656 EFTA 11.231
2 Korea-Singapore 0.632 CER 11.072
3 US-Singapore 0.618 Korea-Singapore 9.904
4 EFTA 0.606 Mexico-EU 9.514
5 Chile-Korea 0.584 Japan-Mexico 9.492
6 Japan-Mexico 0.538 US-Singapore 9.251
7 NAFTA 0.534 Chile-Korea 9.131
8 Japan-Singapore 0.520 AFTA 9.036
9M e x i c o - E U 0.510 Japan-Singapore 8.886
10 Australia-US 0.496 NAFTA 8.338
11 AFTA 0.440 Australia-US 7.320
**: Significant at 5% level.
Rank Correlation Coefficients: 0.682**
Simple Averages Factor Analysis
Mode 4
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8. Summary 
All the agreements examined include a treatment of services. However a review of the 
form and content of agreement finds a wide range of approaches, with respect to listing 
commitments, the adoption of sectoral classification schemes, the interaction of sectoral 
and horizontal commitments, and the treatment of investment. The variety of 
approaches and the variations in sectoral coverage (either through their exclusions, or 
through reservations or through the overriding effects of horizontal clauses) suggest that 
extension of any benefits to non-members will be difficult. The processes of further 
steps in liberalisation are not often specified in the GATS type agreements but are more 
likely to be specified in NAFTA style negative-list agreements. 
 
Where data are available, commitments with respect to sectoral matters appear to be 
wider-ranging advanced compared to those already made in the GATS, but constrained 
by horizontal commitments or other reservations or restrictions.   With respect to other 
provisions, such as domestic regulation, mutual recognition, subsidies, repatriation of 
funds, transparency and anti-competitive practices, there are some instances where the 
agreements offer a wider coverage, but also in those cases reservations continued to be 
applied. 
 
The agreements adopting the NAFTA-template generally seem to pursue more liberal 
stance for trade in services in the form of agreement such as leeway of future 
negotiation, general provisions on national treatment and market access and coverage of 
liberalizing measures, but the actual effectiveness of agreements, influenced by the 
horizontal and specific commitments, have been considerably diminished by sectoral   30
reservations, regardless of the form of agreement. 
 
The features of the agreements vary depending on the participation economies.  Table 
8, based on the bigger sample of agreements, indicates that the degree of liberalization 
of trade in services is relatively low in the regional agreements between developing 
countries. The weighted score denotes the overall score on services liberalization where 
each score is summed by being weighed by the first principal component representing 
the extent of liberalization on the form of agreement, as discussed in Section 7. 
Interestingly, the agreements between developed countries and developing ones are 
relatively liberal, even compared with the agreements between developed countries. 
However, the sectoral exclusions are also then relatively large, implying that the 
substantial impacts of agreements are not always significant. 
 



















*: Based on the WTO classification.  
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Generally the lack of sectoral coverage, or where a sector is included the presence of 
reservations, reduces the impact of these agreements on regional services trade.    There 
will be some markets where provisions are made available but where that occurs it is 
possible that the effect is more likely to lead to sharing of positions in a protected 
market rather than the introduction of competition.  This situation, however, is not 
unique to bilateral agreements and as noted in other work a bias towards national 
treatment rather than market access liberalisation is also evident in multilateral 
negotiation.  However by their nature, the tendency in this direction is more likely in 
preferential  negotiation.  The  extent  of  this bias is a topic for further work. 
   32
References 
 
Nikomborirak, D and S.M. Stephenson (2001). “Liberalization of Trade in Services: 
East Asia and the Western Hemisphere.” Presented at PECC Trade Policy Forum, 
“Regional Trading arrangements: Stocktake and Next Steps,” Bangkok, June 12-13. 
Mattoo, A .and P. Sauve eds. (2003). Domestic Regulation and Service Trade 
Liberalization. The World Bank and Oxford University Press: Washington, DC. 
OECD (2001). Trade in Services: Negotiating Issues and Approaches. Paris. 
--------- (2002). “Labour Mobility in Regional Trade Agreements.” Working Party of the 
Trade Committee Working Paper 16. 
---------  (2002). “The Relationship between Regional Trade Agreements and the 
Multilateral Trading System - Investment.” Working Party of the Trade Committee 
Working Paper 18. 
---------  (2002). “The Relationship between Regional Trade Agreements and the 
Multilateral Trade System – Services.” Working Party of the Trade Committee Working 
Paper 27. 
Sauve, P. and R.M. Stern eds. (2000). “GATS 2000: New Directions in Services Trade 
Liberalization. Center for Business and Government, Harvard University, Brookings 
Institution Press: Washington, D.C. 
Stephenson, S.M. (2002). “Can Regional Liberalization of Services go further than 
Multinational Liberalization under the GATS?” World Trade Review 1(2), 1-33. 
WTO (2001). Guidelines for the scheduling of specific commitments under the General 
Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS), S/L/92. 
   33
Table A-1    Templates for Cross-Border Trade in Services 




Excludes only air passenger transport or government services 0.8
Excludes air passenger transport and govt services (same as GATS) 0.75
Excludes more than GATS
     (e.g. financial services, maritime transport, audio-vidual, govt procurement) 0.5
Endeavours with unspecified scope (cooperation or no detailed provisions) 0.2
No services provisions 0
MFN
Negative list bindings 1





None for new bilateral agreements  0.5
Some for new bilateral agreements 0.25
For all existing and new bilateral agreements or no commitment on MFN 0
National treatment
Negative list bindings 1
Negative list bindings - some sectors 0.75
Positive list bindings - all sectors 0.5
Best endeavours 0.25
No commitment 0
Market access (ie prohibition on quantitative restrictions as in GATS)
Negative list bindings 1
Negative list bindings - some sectors 0.75
Positive list bindings - all sectors 0.5
Best endeavours 0.25
No commitment 0
Local presence not required (right of non-establishment)
Has this provision  1
Has this provision, but with some exemptions 0.5
Doesn’t have this provision 0
Domestic regulation
General provisions as in GATS plus necessity test (or equivalent) 1
General provisions as in GATS (transparency, not a disguised restriction) 0.75
Measures in a reasonable and impartial manner 0.4
Provisions for specific sectors eg professions 0.25
No  provisions 0
Transparency (scores additive)
Prior comment 0.3
Publish (as in GATS) 0.4
National inquiry point (as in GATS) 0.3
Recognition
General provisions as in GATS (nondiscrimination, based in international standards)
     plus provisions for all sectors 1
General provisions as in GATS (nondiscrimination, based in international standards)
     plus provisions for specific sectors 0.75
General provisions as in GATS (nondiscrimination, based in international standards) 0.5
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Table A-1(continued) Templates for Cross-Border Trade in Services 
Score
Monopolies and exclusive services providers
Stronger than general provisions in GATS  1
General provisions as in GATS
     (not act inconsistently with commitments, not anticompetitive in other markets) 0.75
General provisions as in GATS plus some exceptions 0.6
Provisions for specific sectors eg telecommunications 0.5
No provisions 0
Business practices
Stronger than the GATS 1
General provisions as in GATS (consult with a view to eliminating) 0.75
Provisions for specific sectors 0.5
No provisions 0
Transfers and payments 
No restrictions except to safeguard balance of payments 1
Restrictions in other prescribed circumstances 0.5
No provisions 0
Denial of benefits (i.e. rules of origin)
Denial only to persons that do not conduct substantial
(or any) business operations in other party 1
Tougher treatment to specific sectors 0.75
Tougher treatment to all sectors 0.5
Total denial if owned by third party, or no provisions to prevent denial 0
Safeguards
General provisions 0
Provisions for particular sectors 0.25
Future negotiations 0.5
No provisions or banned 1
Subsidies
Provisions limiting their use 1
Consultation 0.5
Future negotiations to limit their use 0.25
No provisions 0
Government procurement in services 
Provisions on non-discriminatory access 1
Provisions for access in some sectors 0.75
Future negotiations 0.5
No provisions, or no access 0
Ratchet mechanism
All subsequent unilateral liberalisation to be bound 1
Sectoral exceptions to ratchet mechanism 0.75
No mechanism 0
Telecommunications (scores additive)
Interconnection (access to and use of PSTN
and services by service suppliers of other party) 0.5
Unbundling 0.1
Particular services (eg leased circuits, resale, number portability) 0.1
Competitive safeguards 0.1
Univeral Service Obligations 0.1
Allocation of scarce resources (eg spectrum) 0.1
Financial services (scores additive)
Prudential carveout 0.4
Provision for recognition of prudential measures 0.2
NT for access to payments and clearing systems 0.1




Table A-1(continued) Templates for Cross-Border Trade in Services 
 
(2) CONTENT OF AGREEMENT
Score
Excluded modes
No modes excluded by one or more parties  1
One mode excluded by one or more parties (e.g. mode 4) 0.5
Two or more modes excluded by one or more parties, or no provisions 0
Excluded measures
No measures (MFN, NT, MA) excluded by one or more parties 1
One measure (e.g. MA) excluded by one or more parties 0.5
More than one measure excluded by one or more party, or no provisions 0
Sectoral exclusions: Total sectors: 138 (based on CPC)
No sectors excluded by one or more parties  1
25% sectors excluded by one or more parties (e.g. maritime, audiovisual) 0.75
25-50% sectors excluded by one or more parties (e.g. maritime, audiovisual) 0.5
50-75% sectors excluded by one or more parties 0.25
75-100% sectors excluded by one or more parties  0
Measures at regional revel
No measures at sub-national (state or provincial) level excluded 1
Measures at local level excluded by one or more parties 0.7
Measures at State level excluded by one or more parties  0.4
Measures at all subnational levels excluded by one or more parties,
or no provisions on services trade 0
Restrictions on land purchases
No 1
Yes or no services provisions 0
Reservations on Minority
No 1
Yes or no services provisions 0
Requirements on the number of domestic employees
No 1





Table A-2    Templates for Investment 
 
(1)  FORM OF AGREEMENT
Score
Sectoral coverage
Beyond services (in separate chapter) 1
Services only (mode 3 in services chapter) 0.5
Based on bilateral treaties 0.4
Endeavours without specified scope 0.25
None 0
Scope of MFN, NT etc provisions (scores additive)
Establishment (i.e. greenfield) 0.3
Acquisition (i.e. merger) 0.2
Post-establishment operation  0.3
Resale (i.e. free movement of capital) 0.2
MFN
Negative list bindings 1





None for new bilateral agreements  0.5
Some for new bilateral agreements 0.25
For all existing and new bilateral agreements, or no provisions to prevent exemptions 0
National treatment
Negative list bindings - all sectors 1
Negative list bindings - some sectors 0.75
Positive list bindings - all sectors 0.5
Best endeavours 0.25
No commitment 0
Nationality (residency) of management and board of directors
Cannot restrict either 1
Cannot restrict either, with sectoral exceptions 0.75
Can partially restrict board of directors  0.5
Can partially restrict management or both.
Alternatively, sectoral promises to liberalise, but no general promise. 0.25
No provisions limiting restrictions 0
Performance requirements 
No local content, trade or other specified requirements
     (e.g. on technology transfer, or where to sell) 1
No local content or trade requirements ie as in TRIMS 0.75
Provisions more limited than TRIMS 0.5
No provisions 0
Category  37





Publish (as in GATS) 0.4
National inquiry point (as in GATS) 0.3
Denial of benefits (i.e. rules of origin)
Denial only to persons that do not conduct substantial
(or any) business operations in other party 1
Tougher treatment to specific sectors 0.75
Tougher treatment to all sectors 0.5
Total denial if owned by third party, or no provisions 0
Expropriation etc. (scores additive)
Minimum standard of treatment  0.2
Treatment in case of strife 0.4
Expropriation and  compensation 0.4
Transfers and payments 
No restrictions except to safeguard balance of payments 1
Restrictions in other prescribed circumstances 0.5
No provisions 0














Provisions on non-discriminatory access 1
Provisions for access in some sectors 0.75
Future negotiations 0.5
No provisions, or completely excluded 0
Ratchet mechanism
All subsequent unilateral liberalisation to be bound 1
Sectoral exceptions to ratchet mechanism 0.75
No mechanism 0
Category  38
Table A-2(continued)    Templates for Investment 
 
(2)  CONTENT OF AGREEMENT
Score
Excluded measures
No measures (MFN, NT, MA) excluded by one or more parties 1
One measure (eg MA) excluded by one or more parties 0.5
More than one measure excluded by one or more party, or no provisions  0
Sectoral exclusions: Total sectors: 138 (based on CPC)
No sectors excluded by one or more parties  1
25% sectors excluded by one or more parties (e.g. maritime, audiovisual) 0.75
25-50% sectors excluded by one or more parties (e.g. maritime, audiovisual) 0.5
50-75% sectors excluded by one or more parties 0.25
75-100% sectors excluded by one or more parties  0
Measures at regional revel
No measures at sub-national level excluded 1
Measures at local level excluded by one or more parties 0.7
Measures at State level excluded by one or more parties  0.4
Measures at all subnational levels excluded by one or more parties,
or no provisions on investment 0
Restrictions on land purchases
No 1
Yes or no services provisions 0
Reservations on Minority
No 1
Yes or no services provisions 0
Requirement of prior residence for establishment
No 1
Yes or no services provisions 0
General restrictions on foreign capital participation
No 1
Yes or no services provisions 0







Table A-3    Templates for Movement of People 
 
(1)  FORM OF AGREEMENT
Score
Sectoral coverage
Beyond services and investment (separate chapter) 1
Services and investment (in both services and investment chapters) 0.75




Allows permanent immigration 1
Includes access to labour market 0.75
Temporary movement only 0.5
No clear scope 0.25
None 0
Immigration 
Requires changes to immigration procedures (e.g. visa quotas or eligibility criteria) 1
Subject to existing immigration laws and procedures, or no provisions 0
MFN for mode 4 delivery
Negative list bindings 1





None for new bilateral agreements  0.5
Some for new bilateral agreements 0.25
For all existing and new bilateral agreements or no commitment on MFN 0
National treatment for mode 4 delivery
Negative list bindings 1
Negative list bindings - some sectors 0.75




Table A-3(continued)    Templates for Movement of People 
 
Score
Market access (i.e. prohibition on quantitative restrictions as in GATS)
Negative list bindings 1
Negative list bindings - some sectors 0.75




General provisions as in GATS plus necessity test (or equivalent) 1
General provisions as in GATS (transparency, not a disguised restriction) 0.75
Measures in a reasonable and impartial manner 0.4
Provisions for specific sectors eg professions 0.25
No  provisions 0
Transparency of regulations governing service delivery via mode 4 (scores additive)
Prior comment 0.3
Publish (as in GATS) 0.4
National inquiry point (as in GATS) 0.3
Transparency of regulations governing temporary movement of persons (scores additive)
Expedite procedures 0.3
Publish  0.4
Answer queries or comments 0.3
Recognition
General provisions as in GATS (nondiscrimination, based in international standards)
     plus provisions for all sectors 1
General provisions as in GATS (nondiscrimination, based in international standards)
     plus provisions for specific sectors 0.75
General provisions as in GATS (nondiscrimination, based in international standards) 0.5
Provisions for specific sectors, e.g. legal, engineering 0.25
Endeavor 0.2
No provisions 0
Denial of benefits (i.e. rules of origin)
Denial only to persons that do not conduct substantial (or any) business operations in other party 1
Tougher treatment to specific sectors 0.75
Tougher treatment to all sectors 0.5
Total denial if owned by third party or no provisions 0
Ratchet mechanism
All subsequent unilateral liberalisation to be bound 1
Sectoral exceptions to ratchet mechanism 0.75
No mechanism 0
Category  41
Table A-3(continued)    Templates for Movement of People 
(2)  CONTENT OF AGREEMENT-SERVICE DELIVERY
Score
General reservations/exceptions
No measures (MFN, NT, MA) excluded by one or more parties 1
One measure (e.g. MA) excluded by one or more parties 0.5
More than one measure excluded by one or more party, or no provisions on movement of people 0
Sectoral exclusions: Total sectors: 138 (based on CPC)
No sectors excluded by one or more parties  1
25% sectors excluded by one or more parties (e.g. maritime, audiovisual) 0.8
25-50% sectors excluded by one or more parties (e.g. maritime, audiovisual) 0.6
50-75% sectors excluded by one or more parties 0.4
75-100% sectors excluded by one or more parties  0.2
Measures at regional revel
No measures at sub-national level excluded 1
Measures at local level excluded by one or more parties 0.7
Measures at State level excluded by one or more parties  0.4
Measures at all subnational levels excluded by one or more parties,
or no provisions on movement of people 0
(3)  CONTENT OF AGREEMENT-FACILITATION OF MOBILITY
Score
Skill coverage (least generous treatment among members of FTA)
All groups (including unskilled) 1
All business persons, traders and investors, intracorporate transferees, and professionals 0.5
A subset of the above (eg specialists, managers and intracorporate transferees) 0.25
No groups 0
Short term entry (least generous treatment among members of FTA)
Over 90 days or no time limit mentioned 1
Up to 90 days 0.75
Up to 60 days 0.5
Up to 30 days 0.25
No short term entry, or in the case of unbinding service provisions (e.g. endeavors) 0
Long term entry (least generous treatment among members of FTA)
5 years or more or no time limit mentioned 1
Up to 4 years 0.8
Up to 3 years 0.6
Up to 2 years 0.4
Up to 1 year 0.2
No long term entry, or in the case of unbinding service provisions (e.g. endeavors) 0
Quotas on numbers of entrants
No (or not mentioned) 1
Yes, or in the case of unbinding service provisions (e.g. endeavors) 0
Needs test
Prohibited 1
Can be applied (or not mentioned or in the case of unbinding service provisions (e.g. endeavors)) 0
Local labour market testing or other criteria
All such tests prohibited or not required 1
Some such tests prohibited or not required 0.5
No prohibitions (or not mentioned or in the case of unbinding service provisions (e.g. endeavors) 0
Restrictions on land purchases
No 1
Yes or no services provisions 0
Considerations on Minority
No 1
Yes or no services provisions 0
Requirements on the number of domestic employees
No 1













































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table A-5:    Sectoral exclusions – Cross-Boarder trade 
 
(% of sub-sectors excluded: Total sub-sectors=138) 
GATS GATS GATS GATS GATS GATS
AFTA 90.0 80.4 89.0 83.3 25.0 75.0 100.0 96.9 100.0 92.5 100.0 87.5
Brunei 83.3 88.1 71.4 100.0 0.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Cambodia 85.7 52.4 100.0 61.9 0.0 100.0 100.0 75.0 100.0 40.0 100.0 0.0
Indonesia 100.0 100.0 100.0 85.7 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Laos 92.9 - 61.9 - 50.0 - 100.0 - 100.0 - 100.0 -
Malaysia 88.1 42.9 61.9 42.9 0.0 0.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Myanmar 92.9 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Philippines 85.7 100.0 100.0 100.0 0.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Singapore 78.6 61.9 95.2 85.7 0.0 0.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Thailand 95.2 97.6 100.0 90.5 0.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Vietnam 97.6 - 100.0 - 0.0 - 100.0 - 100.0 - 100.0 -
AFTA-China 100.0 71.1 100.0 82.1 100.0 37.5 100.0 85.9 100.0 96.3 100.0 43.8
AFTA 100.0 80.4 100.0 83.3 100.0 75.0 100.0 96.9 100.0 92.5 100.0 87.5
China 100.0 61.9 100.0 81.0 100.0 0.0 100.0 75.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 0.0
Australia-US 7.1 31.0 23.8 23.8 0.0 0.0 37.5 25.0 10.0 70.0 0.0 50.0
Australia 9.5 28.6 23.8 38.1 0.0 0.0 50.0 25.0 20.0 40.0 0.0 0.0
USA 4.8 33.3 23.8 9.5 0.0 0.0 25.0 25.0 0.0 100.0 0.0 100.0
CER 0.0 41.7 4.8 35.7 0.0 0.0 0.0 25.0 0.0 40.0 0.0 50.0
Australia 0.0 28.6 0.0 38.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 25.0 0.0 40.0 0.0 0.0
New Zealand 0.0 54.8 9.5 33.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 25.0 0.0 40.0 0.0 100.0
Chile-Korea 29.8 82.1 76.2 64.3 50.0 75.0 0.0 87.5 10.0 100.0 0.0 100.0
Chile 28.6 100.0 71.4 71.4 0.0 100.0 0.0 100.0 0.0 100.0 0.0 100.0
Korea 31.0 64.3 81.0 57.1 100.0 50.0 0.0 75.0 20.0 100.0 0.0 100.0
EFTA 22.6 26.8 54.8 58.3 0.0 37.5 43.8 6.3 40.0 55.0 33.3 25.0
Iceland 0.0 23.8 90.5 66.7 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 100.0 0.0 0.0
Liechtenstein 42.9 42.9 66.7 71.4 0.0 100.0 75.0 0.0 40.0 40.0 33.3 0.0
Norway 23.8 16.7 28.6 61.9 0.0 0.0 75.0 25.0 80.0 20.0 100.0 100.0
Switzerland 23.8 23.8 33.3 33.3 0.0 50.0 25.0 0.0 40.0 60.0 0.0 0.0
EU-Mexico 39.6 34.8 71.4 52.4 50.0 0.0 28.1 3.1 23.8 63.8 50.0 0.0
EU (Avg.) 19.6 19.6 76.2 76.2 0.0 0.0 6.3 6.3 27.5 27.5 0.0 0.0
Mexico 59.5 59.5 66.7 66.7 100.0 100.0 50.0 50.0 20.0 20.0 100.0 100.0
Japan-Mexico 31.0 53.6 73.8 45.2 37.5 50.0 12.5 25.0 0.0 10.0 0.0 50.0
Japan 26.2 47.6 76.2 23.8 50.0 0.0 25.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Mexico 35.7 59.5 71.4 66.7 25.0 100.0 0.0 50.0 0.0 20.0 0.0 100.0
Japan-Singapore 33.3 54.8 31.0 54.8 0.0 0.0 37.5 50.0 30.0 50.0 50.0 50.0
Japan 38.1 47.6 14.3 23.8 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 40.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Singapore 28.6 61.9 47.6 85.7 0.0 0.0 75.0 100.0 20.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Korea-Singapore 46.4 63.1 78.6 71.4 50.0 25.0 75.0 87.5 70.0 100.0 66.7 100.0
Korea 59.5 64.3 81.0 57.1 100.0 50.0 50.0 75.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Singapore 33.3 61.9 76.2 85.7 0.0 0.0 100.0 100.0 40.0 100.0 33.3 100.0
NAFTA 19.0 48.4 68.3 46.0 0.0 33.3 0.0 50.0 0.0 73.3 0.0 66.7
Canada 14.3 52.4 61.9 61.9 0.0 0.0 0.0 75.0 0.0 100.0 0.0 0.0
Mexico 28.6 59.5 71.4 66.7 0.0 100.0 0.0 50.0 0.0 20.0 0.0 100.0
USA 14.3 33.3 71.4 9.5 0.0 0.0 0.0 25.0 0.0 100.0 0.0 100.0
Singapore-US 63.1 47.6 92.9 47.6 0.0 0.0 25.0 62.5 50.0 100.0 50.0 100.0
Singapore 26.2 61.9 95.2 85.7 0.0 0.0 50.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
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Table  A-5  (Cont):  Sectoral  exclusions – Cross-Boarder trade 
 
GATS GATS GATS GATS GATS GATS
AFTA 99.4 93.0 100.0 91.7 53.3 54.2 100.0 78.1 92.1 84.8 90.1 83.9
Brunei 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 81.8 100.0 83.3 96.4
Cambodia 100.0 93.8 100.0 66.7 66.7 0.0 100.0 0.0 100.0 81.8 92.0 63.8
Indonesia 100.0 56.3 100.0 100.0 33.3 33.3 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 98.6 91.3
Laos 93.8 - 100.0 - 66.7 - 100.0 - 90.9 - 87.0 -
Malaysia 100.0 100.0 100.0 66.7 33.3 33.3 100.0 50.0 93.9 90.9 84.8 65.2
Myanmar 100.0 93.8 100.0 100.0 33.3 33.3 100.0 100.0 93.9 57.6 94.9 87.7
Philippines 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 66.7 66.7 100.0 100.0 100.0 66.7 92.0 91.3
Singapore 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 33.3 66.7 100.0 75.0 90.9 90.9 86.2 79.7
Thailand 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 66.7 100.0 100.0 100.0 81.8 90.9 90.6 95.7
Vietnam 100.0 - 100.0 - 33.3 - 100.0 - 87.9 - 92.0 -
AFTA-China 100.0 87.1 100.0 95.8 100.0 43.8 100.0 89.1 100.0 84.8 100.0 78.2
AFTA 100.0 93.0 100.0 91.7 100.0 54.2 100.0 78.1 100.0 84.8 100.0 83.9
China 100.0 81.3 100.0 100.0 100.0 33.3 100.0 100.0 100.0 84.8 100.0 72.5
Australia-US 100.0 100.0 33.3 83.3 0.0 16.7 0.0 25.0 16.7 81.8 23.6 51.4
Australia 100.0 100.0 33.3 100.0 0.0 33.3 0.0 50.0 6.1 78.8 22.5 51.4
USA 100.0 100.0 33.3 66.7 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 27.3 84.8 24.6 51.4
CER 3.1 100.0 0.0 100.0 0.0 16.7 12.5 75.0 27.3 72.7 8.0 55.1
Australia 0.0 100.0 0.0 100.0 0.0 33.3 0.0 50.0 27.3 78.8 6.5 51.4
New Zealand 6.3 100.0 0.0 100.0 0.0 0.0 25.0 100.0 27.3 66.7 9.4 58.7
Chile-Korea 100.0 96.9 16.7 100.0 0.0 0.0 25.0 100.0 47.0 97.0 46.4 84.8
Chile 100.0 100.0 0.0 100.0 0.0 0.0 25.0 100.0 42.4 100.0 42.0 93.5
Korea 100.0 93.8 33.3 100.0 0.0 0.0 25.0 100.0 51.5 93.9 50.7 76.1
EFTA 100.0 81.3 75.0 83.3 8.3 33.3 43.8 50.0 43.2 69.7 43.7 50.9
Iceland 100.0 100.0 0.0 100.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 25.0 66.7 69.7 41.3 52.2
Liechtenstein 100.0 100.0 100.0 33.3 33.3 100.0 50.0 50.0 9.1 81.8 45.7 63.8
Norway 100.0 25.0 100.0 100.0 0.0 0.0 75.0 75.0 54.5 81.8 47.8 44.9
Switzerland 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 0.0 33.3 50.0 50.0 42.4 45.5 39.9 42.8
EU-Mexico 68.8 68.8 83.3 100.0 52.1 68.8 62.5 62.5 89.4 78.8 61.2 53.3
EU (Average) 37.5 37.5 100.0 100.0 37.5 37.5 25.0 25.0 81.8 81.8 46.4 46.4
Mexico 100.0 100.0 66.7 66.7 66.7 66.7 100.0 100.0 97.0 97.0 76.1 76.1
Japan-Mexico 100.0 100.0 33.3 66.7 0.0 33.3 25.0 50.0 75.8 83.3 53.3 62.0
Japan 100.0 100.0 33.3 66.7 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 60.6 69.7 48.6 47.8
Mexico 100.0 100.0 33.3 66.7 0.0 66.7 50.0 100.0 90.9 97.0 58.0 76.1
Japan-Singapore 93.8 100.0 16.7 83.3 16.7 33.3 37.5 37.5 66.7 80.3 46.7 63.8
Japan 100.0 100.0 0.0 66.7 0.0 0.0 25.0 0.0 69.7 69.7 44.2 47.8
Singapore 87.5 100.0 33.3 100.0 33.3 66.7 50.0 75.0 63.6 90.9 49.3 79.7
Korea-Singapore 90.6 96.9 83.3 100.0 0.0 33.3 37.5 87.5 53.0 92.4 59.8 77.9
Korea 93.8 93.8 100.0 100.0 0.0 0.0 75.0 100.0 60.6 93.9 70.3 76.1
Singapore 87.5 100.0 66.7 100.0 0.0 66.7 0.0 75.0 45.5 90.9 49.3 79.7
NAFTA 75.0 89.6 33.3 77.8 0.0 44.4 16.7 66.7 46.5 88.9 37.2 64.5
Canada 25.0 68.8 33.3 100.0 0.0 66.7 0.0 100.0 54.5 84.8 30.4 65.9
Mexico 100.0 100.0 33.3 66.7 0.0 66.7 25.0 100.0 54.5 97.0 45.7 76.1
USA 100.0 100.0 33.3 66.7 0.0 0.0 25.0 0.0 30.3 84.8 35.5 51.4
Singapore-US 100.0 100.0 66.7 83.3 0.0 33.3 0.0 37.5 39.4 87.9 59.4 65.6
Singapore 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 0.0 66.7 0.0 75.0 24.2 90.9 49.3 79.7
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Table  A-5  (Cont):  Sectoral  exclusions - Investment 
 
GATS GATS GATS GATS GATS GATS
AFTA 13.5 86.6 77.7 91.1 18.8 75.0 14.1 96.9 25.0 92.5 0.0 87.5
Brunei 97.6 97.6 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Cambodia 85.7 52.4 100.0 61.9 0.0 0.0 100.0 75.0 100.0 40.0 100.0 0.0
Indonesia 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Laos 92.9 - 52.4 - 100.0 - 100.0 - 100.0 - 100.0 -
Malaysia 92.9 76.2 100.0 95.2 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Myanmar 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Philippines 100.0 100.0 100.0 95.2 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Singapore 83.3 66.7 95.2 85.7 0.0 0.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Thailand 78.6 100.0 100.0 90.5 0.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Vietnam 100.0 - 100.0 - 100.0 - 100.0 - 100.0 - 100.0 -
AFTA-China 100.0 90.9 100.0 93.2 100.0 87.5 100.0 98.4 100.0 96.3 100.0 93.8
AFTA 100.0 86.6 100.0 91.1 100.0 75.0 100.0 96.9 100.0 92.5 100.0 87.5
China 100.0 95.2 100.0 95.2 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Australia-US 3.6 32.1 57.1 59.5 0.0 0.0 12.5 12.5 10.0 70.0 0.0 50.0
Australia 4.8 26.2 90.5 71.4 0.0 0.0 25.0 0.0 20.0 40.0 0.0 0.0
USA 2.4 38.1 23.8 47.6 0.0 0.0 0.0 25.0 0.0 100.0 0.0 100.0
CER 0.0 41.7 4.8 85.7 0.0 0.0 0.0 12.5 0.0 40.0 0.0 50.0
Australia 0.0 26.2 0.0 71.4 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 40.0 0.0 0.0
New Zealand 0.0 57.1 9.5 100.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 25.0 0.0 40.0 0.0 100.0
Chile-Korea 4.8 66.7 76.2 78.6 50.0 100.0 0.0 100.0 50.0 100.0 0.0 100.0
Chile 2.4 92.9 71.4 100.0 0.0 100.0 0.0 100.0 0.0 100.0 0.0 100.0
Korea 7.1 40.5 81.0 57.1 100.0 100.0 0.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 0.0 100.0
EFTA 100.0 34.5 100.0 59.5 100.0 43.8 100.0 43.8 100.0 80.0 100.0 33.3
Iceland 10.7 26.2 92.9 66.7 0.0 0.0 25.0 0.0 50.0 100.0 50.0 66.7
Liechtenstein 93.1 50.0 94.8 71.4 70.0 100.0 100.0 50.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 33.3
Norway 0.0 33.3 90.5 66.7 0.0 0.0 0.0 50.0 0.0 100.0 0.0 33.3
Switzerland 21.4 28.6 95.2 33.3 0.0 75.0 50.0 75.0 100.0 20.0 100.0 0.0
EU-Mexico 25.6 36.5 54.8 72.2 6.3 59.4 43.8 32.0 40.0 22.5 25.0 50.0
EU (Average) 0.0 13.5 90.5 77.7 0.0 18.8 0.0 14.1 0.0 25.0 0.0 0.0
Mexico 31.0 100.0 28.6 100.0 0.0 100.0 75.0 100.0 80.0 100.0 33.3 100.0
Japan-Singapore 7.1 67.9 38.1 76.2 12.5 50.0 12.5 50.0 40.0 100.0 0.0 66.7
Japan 4.8 35.7 9.5 52.4 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 100.0 0.0 33.3
Singapore 9.5 100.0 66.7 100.0 25.0 100.0 25.0 100.0 80.0 100.0 0.0 100.0
Japan-Mexico 28.6 51.2 45.2 69.0 50.0 0.0 12.5 50.0 60.0 100.0 50.0 66.7
Japan 31.0 35.7 42.9 52.4 100.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 80.0 100.0 0.0 33.3
Mexico 26.2 66.7 47.6 85.7 0.0 0.0 25.0 100.0 40.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Korea-Singapore 28.6 53.6 76.2 71.4 50.0 50.0 75.0 100.0 80.0 100.0 66.7 100.0
Korea 28.6 40.5 76.2 57.1 100.0 100.0 50.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Singapore 28.6 66.7 76.2 85.7 0.0 0.0 100.0 100.0 60.0 100.0 33.3 100.0
NAFTA 7.1 57.9 68.3 71.4 33.3 41.7 8.3 58.3 20.0 100.0 0.0 66.7
Canada 7.1 35.7 61.9 66.7 0.0 25.0 0.0 50.0 0.0 100.0 0.0 0.0
Mexico 4.8 100.0 71.4 100.0 100.0 100.0 25.0 100.0 60.0 100.0 0.0 100.0
USA 9.5 38.1 71.4 47.6 0.0 0.0 0.0 25.0 0.0 100.0 0.0 100.0
Singapore-US 28.6 52.4 33.3 66.7 25.0 0.0 25.0 62.5 0.0 100.0 33.3 100.0
Singapore 56.8 66.7 88.8 85.7 59.4 0.0 57.0 100.0 62.5 100.0 50.0 100.0
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Table  A-5  (Cont):  Sectoral  Exclusions – Investment 
 
GATS GATS GATS GATS GATS GATS
AFTA 87.5 92.2 22.9 95.8 12.5 91.7 29.7 84.4 79.0 91.7 48.5 89.6
Brunei 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 99.3 99.3
Cambodia 100.0 81.3 100.0 66.7 100.0 66.7 100.0 0.0 100.0 81.8 92.8 60.9
Indonesia 100.0 68.8 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 96.4
Laos 100.0 - 100.0 - 100.0 - 100.0 - 93.9 - 89.1 -
Malaysia 100.0 93.8 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 97.8 91.3
Myanmar 100.0 93.8 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 99.3
Philippines 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 93.9 66.7 98.6 91.3
Singapore 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 66.7 66.7 100.0 75.0 100.0 90.9 90.6 81.2
Thailand 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 66.7 100.0 100.0 100.0 97.0 93.9 89.1 97.1
Vietnam 100.0 - 100.0 - 100.0 - 100.0 - 100.0 - 100.0 -
AFTA-China 100.0 96.1 100.0 97.9 100.0 95.8 100.0 92.2 100.0 95.8 100.0 93.7
AFTA 100.0 92.2 100.0 95.8 100.0 91.7 100.0 84.4 100.0 91.7 100.0 89.6
China 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 97.8
Australia-US 100.0 100.0 66.7 83.3 0.0 33.3 12.5 37.5 21.2 83.3 29.0 58.0
Australia 100.0 100.0 100.0 66.7 0.0 0.0 25.0 50.0 15.2 72.7 34.8 52.2
USA 100.0 100.0 33.3 100.0 0.0 66.7 0.0 25.0 27.3 93.9 23.2 63.8
CER 3.1 56.3 0.0 83.3 0.0 0.0 12.5 75.0 27.3 72.7 8.0 56.5
Australia 0.0 100.0 0.0 66.7 0.0 0.0 0.0 50.0 27.3 72.7 6.5 52.2
New Zealand 6.3 12.5 0.0 100.0 0.0 0.0 25.0 100.0 27.3 72.7 9.4 60.9
Chile-Korea 100.0 100.0 0.0 100.0 0.0 16.7 12.5 100.0 30.3 98.5 35.5 84.4
Chile 100.0 100.0 0.0 100.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 100.0 27.3 97.0 29.7 94.9
Korea 100.0 100.0 0.0 100.0 0.0 33.3 25.0 100.0 33.3 100.0 41.3 73.9
EFTA 100.0 100.0 100.0 83.3 100.0 58.3 100.0 68.8 100.0 71.2 100.0 59.4
Iceland 100.0 100.0 33.3 100.0 0.0 66.7 0.0 100.0 37.9 78.8 42.4 60.1
Liechtenstein 100.0 100.0 100.0 33.3 93.3 100.0 100.0 50.0 98.5 81.8 95.7 70.3
Norway 100.0 100.0 33.3 100.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 75.0 54.5 78.8 39.1 60.9
Switzerland 100.0 100.0 33.3 100.0 0.0 66.7 0.0 50.0 21.2 45.5 45.7 46.4
EU-Mexico 100.0 93.8 75.0 44.8 8.3 39.6 43.8 64.8 41.7 88.0 44.2 62.3
EU (Average) 100.0 87.5 0.0 22.9 0.0 12.5 0.0 29.7 66.7 79.0 41.3 48.5
Mexico 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 0.0 100.0 75.0 100.0 54.5 100.0 48.6 100.0
Japan-Singapore 100.0 100.0 33.3 100.0 0.0 50.0 37.5 50.0 80.3 86.4 42.8 77.2
Japan 100.0 100.0 33.3 100.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 63.6 72.7 30.4 54.3
Singapore 100.0 100.0 33.3 100.0 0.0 100.0 75.0 100.0 97.0 100.0 55.1 100.0
Japan-Mexico 90.6 100.0 100.0 100.0 16.7 33.3 37.5 37.5 78.8 81.8 53.6 67.8
Japan 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 0.0 0.0 25.0 0.0 78.8 72.7 55.1 54.3
Mexico 81.3 100.0 100.0 100.0 33.3 66.7 50.0 75.0 78.8 90.9 52.2 81.2
Korea-Singapore 93.8 100.0 83.3 100.0 0.0 50.0 25.0 87.5 56.1 95.5 55.1 77.5
Korea 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 0.0 33.3 50.0 100.0 60.6 100.0 60.1 73.9
Singapore 87.5 100.0 66.7 100.0 0.0 66.7 0.0 75.0 51.5 90.9 50.0 81.2
NAFTA 75.0 100.0 33.3 100.0 0.0 88.9 33.3 75.0 51.5 91.9 37.2 76.3
Canada 25.0 100.0 33.3 100.0 0.0 100.0 0.0 100.0 21.2 81.8 20.3 65.2
Mexico 100.0 100.0 33.3 100.0 0.0 100.0 50.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 55.8 100.0
USA 100.0 100.0 33.3 100.0 0.0 66.7 50.0 25.0 33.3 93.9 35.5 63.8
Singapore-US 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 0.0 66.7 50.0 50.0 36.4 92.4 39.9 72.5
Singapore 93.8 100.0 61.5 100.0 56.3 66.7 64.8 75.0 89.5 90.9 74.2 81.2
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Table  A-5  (Cont):  Sectoral  Exclusions – Movement of People 
 
GATS GATS GATS GATS GATS GATS
AFTA 10.7 82.1 76.2 70.2 6.3 75.0 9.4 90.6 31.3 92.5 0.0 75.0
Brunei 90.5 85.7 57.1 66.7 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Cambodia 76.2 45.2 76.2 28.6 0.0 0.0 100.0 25.0 100.0 40.0 100.0 0.0
Indonesia 100.0 100.0 100.0 85.7 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Laos 95.2 - 100.0 - 100.0 - 100.0 - 100.0 - 100.0 -
Malaysia 85.7 42.9 100.0 28.6 0.0 0.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Myanmar 95.2 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Philippines 97.6 100.0 100.0 81.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Singapore 90.5 100.0 95.2 100.0 0.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Thailand 81.0 83.3 85.7 71.4 0.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 0.0
Vietnam 95.2 - 33.3 - 100.0 - 100.0 - 100.0 - 100.0 -
AFTA-China 100.0 70.8 100.0 49.4 100.0 37.5 100.0 45.3 100.0 96.3 100.0 37.5
AFTA 100.0 82.1 100.0 70.2 100.0 75.0 100.0 90.6 100.0 92.5 100.0 75.0
China 100.0 59.5 100.0 28.6 100.0 0.0 100.0 0.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 0.0
Australia-US 7.1 32.1 23.8 26.2 0.0 50.0 37.5 12.5 10.0 50.0 0.0 50.0
Australia 9.5 23.8 23.8 38.1 0.0 0.0 50.0 0.0 20.0 40.0 0.0 0.0
USA 4.8 40.5 23.8 14.3 0.0 100.0 25.0 25.0 0.0 60.0 0.0 100.0
CER 0.0 39.3 4.8 35.7 0.0 0.0 0.0 12.5 0.0 40.0 0.0 50.0
Australia 0.0 23.8 0.0 38.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 40.0 0.0 0.0
New Zealand 0.0 54.8 9.5 33.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 25.0 0.0 40.0 0.0 100.0
Chile-Korea 29.8 59.5 76.2 45.2 50.0 50.0 0.0 50.0 10.0 100.0 0.0 66.7
Chile 28.6 85.7 71.4 66.7 0.0 100.0 0.0 100.0 0.0 100.0 0.0 100.0
Korea 31.0 33.3 81.0 23.8 100.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 20.0 100.0 0.0 33.3
EFTA 47.6 33.3 61.9 58.3 25.0 68.8 50.0 25.0 20.0 75.0 100.0 25.0
Iceland 51.2 21.4 92.9 66.7 0.0 0.0 25.0 0.0 50.0 100.0 50.0 0.0
Liechtenstein 90.7 50.0 84.8 71.4 60.0 100.0 100.0 25.0 100.0 40.0 100.0 66.7
Norway 76.2 26.2 90.5 61.9 0.0 100.0 0.0 75.0 0.0 100.0 0.0 0.0
Switzerland 26.2 35.7 95.2 33.3 0.0 75.0 50.0 0.0 100.0 60.0 100.0 33.3
EU-Mexico 22.6 55.4 54.8 88.1 0.0 53.1 43.8 54.7 40.0 65.6 33.3 50.0
EU (Average) 0.0 10.7 90.5 76.2 0.0 6.3 0.0 9.4 0.0 31.3 0.0 0.0
Mexico 23.8 47.6 28.6 61.9 0.0 25.0 75.0 50.0 80.0 20.0 100.0 100.0
Japan-Singapore 31.0 40.5 73.8 42.9 37.5 12.5 12.5 25.0 0.0 60.0 0.0 50.0
Japan 26.2 33.3 76.2 23.8 50.0 0.0 25.0 0.0 0.0 100.0 0.0 0.0
Singapore 35.7 47.6 71.4 61.9 25.0 25.0 0.0 50.0 0.0 20.0 0.0 100.0
Japan-Mexico 52.4 66.7 57.1 61.9 50.0 50.0 100.0 50.0 70.0 100.0 50.0 50.0
Japan 4.8 33.3 14.3 23.8 0.0 0.0 100.0 0.0 40.0 100.0 0.0 0.0
Mexico 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Korea-Singapore 46.4 66.7 78.6 61.9 50.0 50.0 75.0 50.0 70.0 100.0 66.7 66.7
Korea 59.5 33.3 81.0 23.8 100.0 0.0 50.0 0.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 33.3
Singapore 33.3 100.0 76.2 100.0 0.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 40.0 100.0 33.3 100.0
NAFTA 19.0 46.0 68.3 34.9 0.0 41.7 0.0 25.0 0.0 60.0 0.0 66.7
Canada 14.3 50.0 61.9 28.6 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 100.0 0.0 0.0
Mexico 28.6 47.6 71.4 61.9 0.0 25.0 0.0 50.0 0.0 20.0 0.0 100.0
USA 14.3 40.5 71.4 14.3 0.0 100.0 0.0 25.0 0.0 60.0 0.0 100.0
Singapore-US 23.8 70.2 33.3 57.1 0.0 100.0 25.0 62.5 40.0 80.0 0.0 100.0
Singapore 29.2 100.0 69.0 100.0 15.6 100.0 29.7 100.0 25.6 100.0 50.0 100.0
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Table  A-5  (Cont):  Sectoral  Exclusions – Movement of People 
 
GATS GATS GATS GATS GATS GATS
AFTA 20.3 63.3 10.4 91.7 10.4 70.8 31.3 81.3 73.1 89.4 37.6 80.1
Brunei 75.0 75.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 81.8 100.0 83.3 87.7
Cambodia 100.0 0.0 100.0 66.7 100.0 33.3 100.0 0.0 90.9 75.8 84.1 40.6
Indonesia 100.0 68.8 100.0 100.0 33.3 66.7 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 98.6 93.5
Laos 93.8 - 100.0 - 100.0 - 100.0 - 90.9 - 95.7 -
Malaysia 87.5 93.8 100.0 66.7 100.0 33.3 100.0 75.0 100.0 90.9 91.3 63.0
Myanmar 100.0 93.8 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 98.6 99.3
Philippines 100.0 75.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 93.9 66.7 97.8 86.2
Singapore 100.0 0.0 100.0 100.0 66.7 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 92.8 88.4
Thailand 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 66.7 33.3 100.0 75.0 93.9 81.8 87.0 81.9
Vietnam 100.0 - 100.0 - 33.3 - 100.0 - 84.8 - 83.3 -
AFTA-China 100.0 41.0 100.0 95.8 100.0 68.8 100.0 90.6 100.0 84.1 100.0 66.8
AFTA 100.0 63.3 100.0 91.7 100.0 70.8 100.0 81.3 100.0 89.4 100.0 80.1
China 100.0 18.8 100.0 100.0 100.0 66.7 100.0 100.0 100.0 78.8 100.0 53.6
Australia-US 100.0 50.0 33.3 83.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 25.0 16.7 74.2 23.6 44.6
Australia 100.0 100.0 33.3 100.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 50.0 6.1 72.7 22.5 47.1
USA 100.0 0.0 33.3 66.7 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 27.3 75.8 24.6 42.0
CER 3.1 50.0 0.0 100.0 0.0 0.0 12.5 75.0 27.3 72.7 8.0 47.8
Australia 0.0 100.0 0.0 100.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 50.0 27.3 72.7 6.5 47.1
New Zealand 6.3 0.0 0.0 100.0 0.0 0.0 25.0 100.0 27.3 72.7 9.4 48.6
Chile-Korea 100.0 62.5 16.7 100.0 0.0 0.0 25.0 100.0 47.0 93.9 46.4 67.8
Chile 100.0 75.0 0.0 100.0 0.0 0.0 25.0 100.0 42.4 97.0 42.0 84.8
Korea 100.0 50.0 33.3 100.0 0.0 0.0 25.0 100.0 51.5 90.9 50.7 50.7
EFTA 100.0 6.3 33.3 75.0 0.0 58.3 100.0 50.0 93.9 66.7 66.7 46.0
Iceland 37.5 0.0 66.7 100.0 0.0 66.7 0.0 25.0 39.4 75.8 48.6 42.8
Liechtenstein 95.6 0.0 100.0 0.0 80.0 100.0 100.0 50.0 93.6 81.8 91.2 55.8
Norway 31.3 0.0 33.3 100.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 75.0 54.5 69.7 54.3 47.1
Switzerland 43.8 25.0 100.0 100.0 0.0 66.7 0.0 50.0 24.2 39.4 42.8 38.4
EU-Mexico 100.0 60.2 75.0 55.2 8.3 55.2 43.8 65.6 43.2 86.6 43.7 68.8
EU (Average) 100.0 20.3 0.0 10.4 0.0 10.4 0.0 31.3 66.7 73.1 41.3 37.6
Mexico 100.0 100.0 100.0 33.3 0.0 0.0 75.0 100.0 54.5 93.9 47.8 66.7
Japan-Singapore 100.0 62.5 33.3 66.7 0.0 0.0 25.0 50.0 75.8 80.3 53.3 52.5
Japan 100.0 25.0 33.3 100.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 60.6 66.7 48.6 38.4
Singapore 100.0 100.0 33.3 33.3 0.0 0.0 50.0 100.0 90.9 93.9 58.0 66.7
Japan-Mexico 50.0 12.5 50.0 100.0 50.0 50.0 62.5 50.0 84.8 83.3 62.7 63.4
Japan 0.0 25.0 0.0 100.0 0.0 0.0 25.0 0.0 69.7 66.7 25.4 38.4
Mexico 100.0 0.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 88.4
Korea-Singapore 0.0 25.0 83.3 100.0 0.0 50.0 37.5 100.0 53.0 95.5 49.3 69.6
Korea 0.0 50.0 100.0 100.0 0.0 0.0 75.0 100.0 60.6 90.9 59.4 50.7
Singapore 0.0 0.0 66.7 100.0 0.0 100.0 0.0 100.0 45.5 100.0 39.1 88.4
NAFTA 75.0 66.7 33.3 66.7 0.0 33.3 16.7 66.7 46.5 81.8 37.2 56.3
Canada 25.0 100.0 33.3 100.0 0.0 100.0 0.0 100.0 54.5 75.8 30.4 60.1
Mexico 100.0 100.0 33.3 33.3 0.0 0.0 25.0 100.0 54.5 93.9 45.7 66.7
USA 100.0 0.0 33.3 66.7 0.0 0.0 25.0 0.0 30.3 75.8 35.5 42.0
Singapore-US 100.0 0.0 100.0 83.3 0.0 50.0 50.0 50.0 42.4 87.9 39.9 65.2
Singapore 60.2 0.0 21.9 100.0 5.2 100.0 65.6 100.0 83.5 100.0 52.2 88.4
USA 100.0 0.0 100.0 66.7 33.3 0.0 50.0 0.0 9.1 75.8 45.7 42.0
Financial
services
Health related
and social services
Tourism
and travel services
Recreational,
cultural
and sporting
services
Transport
services
Total
 